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I. INTRODUCTION
There has been a growing interest in "self help"
mechanisms to counter Internet-mediated threats. Content
providers such as record labels and movie studios have favored
proposed federal legislation that would allow them to disable
copyright infringers' computers.1  Software licensors have
This article was jointly reviewed and edited by YALE JOURNAL OF LAW
& TECHNOLOGY and INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF COMMUNICATIONS LAW &
POLICY
• Curtis E. A. Karnow is a Partner at Sonnenschein, Nath &
Rosenthal, LLP, a member of the firm's e-commerce, security and privacy,
and intellectual property groups, and author of FUTURE CODES: ESSAYS IN
ADVANCED COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY & THE LAW (Artech House, 1997). Email:
ckarnow@sonnenschein.com. For more information, including a list of Mr.
Karnow's publications, see http://www.sonnenschein.com.
1 Representative Howard Berman's bill has been described as
the 'license to hack' bill. "Berman's bill, if enacted, would render copyright
owners immune from liability for hacking into peer-to-peer file trading
networks - as long as they do so in order to stop the dissemination of their
copyrighted material." Julie Hilden, FindLaw, Going After Individuals for
Copyright Violations: The New Bill That Would Grant Copyright Owners a
License to Hack' Peer-to-Peer Networks, Aug. 20, 2002, at
http://writ.news.findlaw.com/hilden/20020820.html. The bill is available at
http://www.politechbot.com/docs/berman.coble.p2p.final.072502.pdf. See, e.g.,
Bureau of National Affairs, Berman to Introduce Bill Aimed at Curbing
Piracy over Internet Peer-To-Peer Networks, 64 PAT. TRADEMARK &
COPYRIGHT J. 190 (2002).
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backed multiple-state legislation, permitting the remote
disabling of software in use by the licensee when the license
terms are breached. 2 Internet security professionals debate the
propriety, and legality, of striking back at computers which
attack the Internet through the introduction of worms, viruses,
and so on, collectively "malware."3
Systems administrators are frustrated that the usual
means of enforcing rights do not work on the Internet. Although
national laws and civil jurisdiction usually stop at the border,
attacks are global, and those responsible for infringements and
network attacks are not only legion, but anonymous. The
Internet's massive, instantaneous distribution of software tools
and data permits very large numbers of unsophisticated users
access to highly efficient decryption tools, as well as to very
powerful data attack weapons. Small children in Hanoi, Prague
and Fairbanks can collapse central web servers in Silicon Valley
and Alexandria, Virginia, and freely distribute the latest films
and pop tunes. The irony is that as more of the global economy
is mediated by the Internet - that is, as we increasingly rely on
the Internet - the technologies become more complex, and more
vulnerable to attack from more people. Even a cursory look at
the figures suggests an almost exponential increase in these
vulnerabilities.4
2 Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act (UCITA),
2002, available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/ulc-frame.htm. See
generally, Jean Braucher, Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act
(UCITA): Objections from the Consumer Perspective, 5 CYBERSPACE LAWYER
2, Sept. 2000, at http ://www.cyberspacelawyerreport.com/
cyberspacelawyerreport/ (registration required) (on file with the Yale Journal
of Law and Technology); Patrick Thibodeau, FTC to Review Software
Licensing Practices, COMPUTERWORLD, Oct. 30, 2000, at
http://www.computerworld.com/governmenttopics/government/policy/story/0, 1
0801,53054,00.html (last visited Nov. 5, 2004); Richard Roberts, NCCUSL
Limiting UCITA Self-help, Sept. 1, 2000, at
http://lawlibrary.ucdavis.edu/LAWLIB/septOO/0005.html; Virginia Piedmont
Technical Council, Electronic Self-Help, at http://leg.vptc.org/
UCITA/self help.html.
3 See infra note 14.
4 Sophos Inc., a company in the business of developing virus
detection routines, detected 7,189 new viruses, worms, and Trojan horses last
year, handling more than 25 new viruses each day. Dan Verton, Viruses Get
Smarter, COMPUTERWORLD, Jan. 27, 2003, at 21, available at
http://www.computerworld.com/securitytopics/
security/story/0,10801,77794,00.html. Incident statistics published by the
United States Computer Emergency Readiness Team (CERT) are ambiguous
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Simultaneously, the legal system is increasingly
incapable of policing the illegal behavior. The United States
court system is ponderous and expensive. One simply cannot go
after every malefactor, and as a practical matter, it is usually
impossible to pursue infringers outside the United States. The
Internet and its language of code are global. They are not
coterminous with any of the usual means of enforcement of laws
and values, because the Internet is not coterminous with any
country, region, or cultural group. The Internet gathers those
who have no contractual relationship, speak no common
language, and are not bound by a common law. Trade sanctions
will not assist. Nations will not permit their citizens to be
policed directly by authorities across the globe. In my own work,
I have tracked anonymous malefactors to towns in Australia,
Eastern Europe and the Bahamas; and there, the trail went
cold. Only in Australia could we have retained local counsel and
perhaps pressed matters with the police, but it was too
expensive, all told.
Resorting to domestic police is frustrating. The FBI has
understandably re-routed resources to combating terrorism, 5
and local authorities do not have the wherewithal to rapidly
react to assaults from other parts of the country. By many
accounts, conventional law enforcement authorities simply do
not have the skills to deal with cyberattacks, and victims such
as banks, financial institutions, and others that deal in sensitive
data are reluctant to go public and in effect turn over the
since, as CERT notes, an "incident" may involve one or a hundred sites, but
the figures are still revealing: reported security incidents increased from 252
in 1990, to 2,412 in 1995, to 21,756 in 2000, and to 82,094 in 2002. See CERT
Statistics, 1988-2004, at http://www.cert.org/stats/cert stats.html; see also,
Bob Tedeschi, Crime Is Soaring in Cyberspace, THE NEW YORK TIMES, Jan,
27, 2003, at C4, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2003/01/27/technology/
27ECOM.html; McAfee World Virus Map at
http://mastdb4.mcafee.com/VirusMap3.asp?Cmd=Map &b=IE &ft=PNG&lang=
en. One industry research group, CMP Realty Research, estimated (perhaps
extravagantly) $1.6 trillion in costs to business on account of malware in
2000. Doug Bedell, Southern California Virus Hunter Stalks His Prey,
DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Nov, 4, 2001, available at
http://www.dallasnews.com (registration required) (on file with the Yale
Journal of Law & Technology).
5 It is true that the U.S.A. Patriot Act brought cyber-attacks
into the definition of terrorism with new penalties of up to 20 years
incarceration. P.L. No. 107-56, § 814(c)(3)(C), 115 Stat 272 (2001) (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C.A. § 1030 (2000)).
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investigation to the authorities. 6 Fundamentally, going to law
enforcement does not stop an attack, at least in the short term.
Rather, it starts an investigation that could take months or
longer to result in an arrest. That's an eternity in Internet time.
As legal systems become less effective in addressing these
concerns, attention naturally turns to technology, and
traditionally, defensive technology. There is a broad range of
products that help to protect networks, to keep content
encrypted, and so on. In the networks security area, firewalls,
intrusion detection systems, 7  authentication devices, and
perimeter protection devices are among the services and
products available. But two general trends of increasing
complexity undermine the efficacy of defensive technologies:
increasingly complex systems and increasing connectivity. The
complex relationship among multiple layers of hardware and
software means that new bugs and avenues to exploitation are
being discovered on a daily basis.8 Larger systems usually
include dispersed, networked, computers operated by
outsourcers, server farms and hosts, other application service
providers, as well as the machines used by the ultimate users.
6 See, e.g., Winn Schwartau, Cyber- Vigilantes Hunt Down
Hackers, CNN.COM, Jan. 12, 1999, at www.cnn.com/TECH/computing/
9901/12/cybervigilantes.idg/; see also Tedeschi supra note 4.
7 John McHugh et al., Defending Yourself: The Role of
Intrusion Detection Systems, 17 IEEE Software 42, (Sept./Oct. 2000),
available at http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/xpl/tocresult.jsp?isNumber
=19003&puNumber=52. A well known intrusion detection product is
Sidewinder. See Secure Computing, Strikeback: The Sidewinder G2 Firewall
Strategy for Intrusion Detection and Response, at
http://www.securecomputing.com/pdf/swind strikeback-sb.pdf (last visited
Nov. 5, 2004). Schwartau has suggested that Sidewinder includes
counterstrike or strike back capabilities. See supra note 6. He may have
been misled by the product description. "Strikeback responses" for
Sidewinder are identifying responses, such as a ping that should be echoed
back by the target, or "tracerroute" that digs through various gateways
through which the attacking IP packet has passed. These are all important
technologies to identify the source of an attack, but none actually disables a
machine or code. Sidewinder's simple ping is not the "ping of death" which
has been used to disable a target computer. Cf Insecure.org, Ping of Death,
at http://www.insecure.org/sploits/ping-o-death.html, (on file with the Yale
Journal of Law & Technology) (last visited on Nov. 4, 2004).
8 See supra note 4; see also Tim Mullen, SecurityFocus,
Strikeback, Part Deux, Jan. 13, 2003, at
http://www.securityfocus.com/columnists/134, (arguing in favor of
neutralizing another's computer system if it is relentlessly attaching your
network) (on file with the Yale Journal of Law & Technology).
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Increased connectivity is manifest in both the onslaught of
"always on" DSL, cable and other high-speed Internet clients,
and in the design of the most popular software (Microsoft),
which favors interoperability and easy data sharing over
compartmentalized (more secure) applications. This massive
connectivity of machines, many of which are not maintained by
users who know anything about security, permits, for example,
the well known distributed denial of service (DDoS) attack, in
which up to millions of computers ('zombies') can be infected
with a worm which then launches its copies simultaneously
against the true target - e.g., Amazon, or eBay - shutting the
target down.9
Together, these factors make it difficult to implement
defensive technologies. Relatively few companies have the
resources and interest to review and implement every bug fix,
and otherwise to keep ahead of the endlessly inventive cracker.
"Information technology infrastructures are becoming so
complex that no one person can understand them, let alone
administer them in a way that is operationally secure." 10 "The
complexity of modern [operating systems] is so extreme that it
precludes any possibility of not having vulnerabilities."1
These vulnerabilities of course give rise to legal liabilities
for the victim. Loss of service and corrupted data can underpin
users' claims for breach of contract, privacy incursions, copyright
violation, negligence and so on. A sustained attack can put a
victim out of business. And owners and operators of zombied
machines, too, can be sued if the attack can be traced to
negligence in the security systems implemented (or rather, not
implemented) on the zombies. 12 To rub salt on those wounds,
9 A classic profile of an attack, and the story of the victim's
communications with the 13-year-old perpetrator, is described in Steve
Gibson, Gibson Research Corporation, The Strange Tale of the Denial of
Service Attacks Against GRC. com, Jan. 28, 2004, at
http://www.grc.com/dos/grcdos.htm (last visited Nov. 4, 2004). The child
perpetrator utilized many hundreds of zombies to bombard grc.com's Internet
router, shutting it down.
10 McHugh, supra note 7, at 45.
11 Robert L. Mitchell, Reality Intrudes On the Internet,
COMPUTERWORLD at 44, Sept. 3, 2001.
12 Liability for the bad acts of others - indirect, or vicarious
liability - is a subject in itself. See e.g., Curtis Karnow, Indirect Liability on
the Internet and Loss of Con trol, a t
http://www.isoc.org/inet99/proceedings/3e/index.htm (on file with the Yale
KARNOW
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California recently enacted a law, now being considered for
nationwide implementation, which would require notification by
a systems operator to persons whose personal data may have
been accessed during a security breach. 13 Some have termed
this an "invitation to sue" provision.
II. THE GENERAL APPLICATION OF COUNTERSTRIKE
Against this background, self help or "strike back" or
"counterstrike" tools have garnered great interest, and sharp
words have been exchanged on proposals to implement
automated counterstrike. Under that plan, a network that finds
itself under attack automatically traces back the source and
shuts down, or partially disables, the attacking machine(s).14
Reminiscent of the Cold War "launch on warning" nuclear
deterrent, the premise is that only a computer can react fast
enough to detect the attack, trace it to a source, and disable the
attacking machine, all in time to have any chance at all of
minimizing the effects of the attack. 15 Something like this has
Journal of Law & Technology); Curtis Karnow, Damned If You Do, Damned If
You Don't: The state of vicarious liability on the Internet, at
http://www.g4techtv.com/techtvvault/features/17059/Damned If You Do Da
mned If YouDont.html? (on file with the Yale Journal of Law &
Technology). For more on suing the operators of zombied machines see
Michael Overly, Downstream Liability, INFORMATION SECURITY, 2001,
available at http://infosecuritymag.techtarget.com/articles/septemberOl/
cover.shtml#sidebar. See also Complaint, CI Host v. Devx.com et al, No. 401-
CV-0105-A, 2002 U.S.Dist LEXIS 3576 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 1, 2002) (on file with
author). The case alleges negligence, trespass, and interference with
prospective contractual advantage by the downstream victim of an attack
against the upstream victim of the same attack.
13 The California law was enacted to prevent identity theft,
designed to alert consumers that their personal data may have been
compromised. The bill was considered both as Senate Bill 1386 and Assembly
Bill 700, and becomes law July, 2003, as Civil Code § 1798.29; Cal. Civ. Code
§ 1798.29 (West 2002).
14 See Tim Mullen, Defending Your Right to Defend.'
Considerations of an Automated Strike-Back Technology, Sept. 10, 2002, at
http://www.hammerofgod.com/strikeback.txt (last updated Sept. 28, 2002);
see also Bruce Schneier, Counterattack, CRYPTO-GRAM NEWSLETTER, Dec. 15,
2002, available at http://www.schneier.com/crypto-gram-0212.html; Mullen,
supra note 8.
15 Recall the vicious speed with which a worm can propagate.
Slammer/Sapphire "was the fastest computer worm in history. As it began
spreading throughout the Internet, it doubled in size every 8.5 seconds. It
infected more than 90 percent of vulnerable hosts within 10 minutes." David
Moore et al., The Spread of the Sapphire/Slammer Worm, Cooperative
6
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been implemented in the past. In response to the Code Red II
(CRII) worm attack, someone created an anti-code-red-II-
default.ida.script which reputedly responded to a CRII probe by
disabling the offending web server, using a backdoor installed by
the CRII worm in the victim's machine. Stories abound of other
aggressive responses to cyberattacks. 16
There are practical issues to consider here. Not all
attacks will so plainly reveal a path back to their source as did
CRII; tracing an attack to an intermediate attacking machine,
not to speak of the computer owned by the originator in a DDoS
attack, may be impossible. Further, intermediate machines, or
zombies in a DDoS attack, may be operated by hospitals,
governmental units, and telecommunications entities such as
Internet service providers that provide connectivity to millions
of people. Therefore, counterstrikes which are not very precisely
targeted to the worm or virus could easily create a remedy worse
Association for Internet Data Analysis, at
http://www.caida.org/outreach/papers/2OO3/sapphire/index.xml (last modified
Sept. 11, 2003) (on file with the Yale Journal of Law & Technology). At its
peak, achieved approximately 3 minutes after it was released, Sapphire
scanned the net at over 55 million IP addresses per second. "It infected at
least 75,000 hosts, perhaps considerably more." Id.; see also CAIDA et al.,
Analysis of the Sapphire Worm, at http://www.caida.org/analysis/security/
sapphire (last modified Feb. 7, 2003) (last visited Nov. 5, 2004). It would not
take much to increase the speed of infection. A 'flash worm' can be built
which attacks all vulnerable machines within a few seconds. See Stuart
Staniford et al., How to Own the Internet in Your Spare Time, at
www.cs.berkeley.edu/-nweaver/cdc.web/ (last visited Nov. 4, 2004) (on file
with the Yale Journal of Law & Technology).
16 See Schwartau, supra note 6. The Pentagon reportedly
struck back against a group of activists who had flooded the Defense
Department's (and other) sites in September 1998. The Pentagon's attack
targeted the attacker's browsers and caused their machines to reboot. Niall
McKay, Pentagon Deflects Web Assault, WIRE NEWS, at
http://www.wired.com/news/print/0,1294,14931,00.html, Sept. 10, 1998 (on
file with the Yale Journal of Law & Technology) (last visited Nov. 4, 2004);
see also When Art Meets Cyberwar, FORBES.COM, Dec. 14, 1998 (last visited
Nov. 5, 2004). Tim Mullen has devised "Enforcer" with reputed strikeback
capabilities, although the brief description available is unclear whether
Enforcer's capabilities extend outside the victim network infrastructure back
to, i.e., the attacker. Tim Mullen, Enforcer, Automated Worm Mitigation for
Private Networks, at http://www.blackhat.com/presentations/win-usa03/bh-
win-03-mullen.pdf (last visited Nov. 4, 2004). The ISP web hosting company
Conxion discovered a denial of service attack against one of its clients, and
configured its server to send the page requests back - crashing the attacker's
machine. Pia Landergren, Hacker Vigilantes Strike Back, CNN.coM, June
20, 2001, at http://www.cnn.com (on file with the Yale Journal of Law and
Technology) (last visited Nov. 5, 2004).
KARNOW
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than the disease. Where the offense is spam and its content is
libelous, malicious or pornographic, the trace will generally lead
to an anonymous account on a server - a server which is
legitimately used for other communications as well. Disabling
that server is overkill.
But practicalities aside, what are the legal risks?
Perhaps we can assume that we will devise precise counterstrike
weapons; perhaps the recording industry can precisely identify
its copyrighted songs, calculate which are licensed to which
users (or machines), and destroy solely the offending copy.
Perhaps data streams can be tagged with the identification
number of the originating machine in every case,17 such that
viruses, worms, and other offending code can be accurately
tracked back to the source, and disabling mechanisms will
target solely the malware.
While it is generally thought to be illegal to strike back,
the rationale is usually based on the practicality of pinpointing
the perpetrator, and killing the wrong machine or code.18 But
even the accurate targeting of a perpetrator's machine itself
presents serious legal issues. Indeed, a host of statutes on their
face make it illegal to attack or disable computers, including
those connected to the Internet. These are the very laws which
make cyberattacks illegal in the first place.1 9
17 Intel and others proposed similar technology in 1999. Chris
Oakes, Firm Sidesteps Intel on Chip ID, WIRED NEWS, at
http://www.wired.com/news/print/0,1294,17624,00.html, Jan. 29, 1999 (on file
with the Yale Journal of Law & Technology). However, privacy advocates
were unenthused. See, e.g., Paul van Slambrouck, New Computer Chi:.
Useful Too] of Privacy Invasion, CSMONITOR.coM, Feb. 16, 1999, at
http://csmweb2.emcweb.com/durable/
1999/02/16/p2s2.htm (last visited Nov. 5, 2004).
18 Jay Lyman, When the Hacked Becomes the Hacker, Nov. 19,
2001, at http://www.newsfactor.com/perl/story/14874.html/ (on file with the
Yale Journal of Law & Technology).
19 See, e.g., Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986, 18 U.S.C.
§ 1030 (2000); Video Privacy Protection Act of 1988, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701 - 2710
(2000); Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000) (prohibiting
circumvention of control access devices). Such acts are also likely unlawful
under the laws of other countries, see, e.g., The Computer Misuse Act, 1990
(Eng.), available at http://www.lboro.ac.uk/computing/policies/misuse-
act.html (on file with the Yale Journal of Law & Technology). A new
European Community treaty, now open for signature, also would make
similar unauthorized access illegal. See Council of Europe - Convention on
Cybercrime, Nov. 23, 2001, available at http://conventions.coe.int/
8
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The legalities of attacks and counterstrikes matter not
only in the civilian world. Information warfare conducted, and
defended against, by governments must also heed the civilian
legalities. This is because it is not possible to clearly distinguish
classic war between nations from the prevalent lower intensity
clashes and retaliation, and this gray area is far more
pronounced and extensive in information warfare, which takes
place without overt hostilities and without physical weapons. It
is increasingly useless in this context to speak of an "act of
war",20 as opposed to "hostile acts" and other terms which denote
continuous low intensity assaults and reconnaissance on the
nation's electronic infrastructure. Such hostile acts are on-
going, sponsored by individuals, groups, and governments from
friendly to the most unfriendly nations. In this gray area, the
legality of strike and counterstrike against an entity that is not
literally "at war" with the United States cannot be determined
by, for example, the commonly accepted law of armed conflict.
Indeed, that law, based primarily on the Hague and Geneva
conventions, does not contemplate information warfare. Rather,
the legality of strike and counterstrike in the typical low
intensity information warfare scenario is likely to devolve to the
legality of the action under the criminal law.21
III. COUNTERSTRIKE AND SELF-DEFENSE LAW
And so the analogy to the legal doctrine of self-defense
comes into play: does self-defense apply to the Internet, and does
it justify counterstrike?
Self defense usually is at stake when a person is
threatened with imminent bodily harm.22 The test is whether
(1) there is an apparent necessity to use force, (2) the force used
was in fact reasonable, and (3) the threatened act was
Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/185.htm (on file with the Yale Journal of Law &
Technology).
20 Maj. David DiCenso, The Legal Issues of Information
Warfare, 13 AIRPOWER J. 85, 95 n.66 (1999), available at
http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/
airchronicles/apj/apj99/sum99/dicenso.pdf (citing Col. Philip Johnson, Primer
Legal Issues in Information Warfare, talking paper) (last visited Nov. 5,
2004).
21 Id.
22 The focus is on self defense of a person, but under some
circumstances one may also use self defense to avoid injury to property.
KARNOW
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unlawful. 23 There are other factors, but the underlying themes
in self-defense are (1) a counterstrike which is proportional to
the harm avoided, and (2) both a good faith subjective, and
objectively reasonable, belief that the counterstrike was
necessary in the sense that there were no adequate
alternatives.24
Disabling an evil-doer's machine is, I suggest, far less
injurious than a DDoS assault, and I suggest that disabling the
attacker's machine (although not necessarily destroying his
data) is a response that is proportional to the threatened
corruption of a victim's file. A "self defense" theory could thus
justify a counterstrike when the threat is malware, as the
erasure of a pirated copy of a film, song or computer game is
proportional to the harm posed by the use of the infringing copy
by the pirate (not to mention the additional harm posed by the
risk that the pirated copy may be further distributed).25
The more difficult issue is that of adequate alternatives.
The elementary alternatives, of course, are for the victim to use
effective perimeter defenses and other protections, thus
diminishing the probability that an attack will succeed, and
failing that, to disconnect from the Internet to avoid the attack.
But that last option is itself often the harm directly sought to be
caused by the malware attack - and classically, self defense
doctrine does not require the victim to back away. Rather, in
most states, one may "stand his ground" and not retreat, and
still be entitled to self defend if the attack progresses. 26
So, what should one think about "adequate alternatives"
such as perimeter defenses? Is one always required to rely on
these defensive alternatives and to forgo the offensive ones? The
central problems in addressing this question are twofold. First,
23 See generally, 1 B.E. WITKIN & NORMAN L. EPSTEIN,
CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL LAW, Defenses §§ 56, 66, 78, 79 (3d ed. 2000). Using
force in self-defense force is generally permitted whether the harm
threatened is serious bodily injury or harm to one's goods. RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 63, 77 (1965); see also STUART BIEGEL, BEYOND OUR
CONTROL? 242 (2001) (describing the common law of self-defense).
24 WITKIN & EPSTEIN, supra note 23, Defenses §66.
25 I make no comment on the often incandescent debate on the
propriety of limiting fair use and other uses of copyrightable materials
though restrictive licensing terms; I assume here the license restrictions are
valid, in every sense.
26 See, e.g., WITKIN & EPSTEIN, supra note 23, §66(4).
10
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we cannot generalize over a wide range of incidents. Second, the
4Csubjective" perspective of the information technology
professional may differ greatly from that of an "objective"
prosecutor, judge, or jury.
There is a wide range of security incidents, ranging from
inadvertent innocuous incursions by badly written computer
scripts to intentional attempts to flood a system with
communication requests and shut it down, to deliberate
penetrations to obtain (or corrupt) highly sensitive data. The
unauthorized entry might be accomplished because the most
elementary security precaution was not taken, or on the other
end of the spectrum, because the perpetrator has devised a
brilliant and entirely unexpected method to exploit a hitherto
unknown problem in an operating system or browser. A judge or
jury might find that "adequate alternatives" existed to head off a
simple, predictable attack, but not for a sophisticated,
unanticipated one.
This is a difficult problem, because standards in this area
are difficult to come by, and the actual competence of systems
administrators, together with the funding provided to them by
upper management, is often low. A good example is the
February 2003 Sapphire worm attack, in which systems
administrators, who had presumably been put on notice by prior
CRII and Nimda attacks, failed to implement simple patches
which would have blocked the spread of the similar Sapphire
attack.2 7 It may be the case, as suggested above, that systems
are simply too complex and mutate too quickly to guard against
every point of failure, but in hindsight, at least, any given
failure will often appear to have been easily preventable. And
there is another consideration. If the counterstrike tool is good
enough to identify the attack and pinpoint the cracker's
machine, how could it not be good enough to block the attack?
27 Robert Lemos, Worm Exposes Apathy, Microsoft Flaws,
CNETNEWS.OM, Jan. 26, 2003, at http://news.com.com/2100-1001-
982135.html ("In the largest such incident since the Code Red and Nimda
worms bored into servers in 2001, the Sapphire worm - also known as
Slammer and SQLExp - infected more than 120,000 computers and caused
chaos within many corporate networks. Some Internet service providers in
Asia were overwhelmed.") (on file with the Yale Journal of Law &
Technology). Microsoft had released the relevant patch six months before the
Sapphire attack. See, RISKS-LIST: 22 RISKS-FORuM DIGEST, Jan. 27, 2003,
at ftp://ftp.sri.com/risks (last visited Nov. 5, 2004).
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In brief, it can be a dicey thing to establish both a good
faith and objectively reasonable belief that there were no
adequate alternatives to a counterstrike. The plethora of
defensive products and services, good practice guidelines (even if
observed more faithfully "in the breach," as it were), and reliable
20/20 hindsight conspire to make self defense a tricky maneuver
to justify. To be sure, it is not impossible to do so, and expert
testimony might help, but because the consequences of guessing
wrong are so onerous - e.g., conviction of a federal felony - the
absence of directly relevant case authority should give should
give one pause; a very long pause.
IV. COUNTERSTRIKE AND NUISANCE LAW
There is another legal doctrine, though, that might hold
more promise, and it is the venerable doctrine of nuisance. In
its amieus brief in Intel v. Hamidi, the Electronic Frontier
Foundation (EFF) developed the concept that an alleged
spammer's assault on Intel's internal email system should be
thought of not as a trespass on Intel's property, but as a
nuisance. 28 Nuisances can be almost anything that interferes
with one's enjoyment of one's property.29  Classic public
nuisances include malodorous factories, diseased plants, fire
hazards, and houses of ill repute.30 Public nuisances affect the
community. Private nuisances are those that affect only a single
person, or one's own property. Usually they are real property
problems such as tree branches and fences which interfere with
the use of real property.31
The remarkable aspect of nuisance law is that it expressly
eontemplates self help. A person affected by a private nuisance,
28 Brief of Amicus Curiae Electronic Frontier Foundation, Intel
v. Hamidi, 114 Cal. Rptr. 2d 244 (2001) (No. C033076), rev'd, 30 Cal. 4th 1342
(2003), a vailable at
http://www.eff.org/Spamcybersquatting-abuse/Spam/Intel v Hamidi/
20000118 eff amicus.html. The court impliedly rejected, or at least bypassed,
EFF's position in a 2-1 vote in its December 10, 2001 opinion. Intel had
earlier claimed both trespass and nuisance, but later dropped the nuisance
claim and won in the trial court on a trespass claim. The case is discussed
further infra note 38.
29 CAL. CIV. CODE § 3479 (West, 1997).
30 NEIL M. LEVY ET AL., 2 CALIFORNIA TORTS § 17.06 (2002).
31 Id., at § 17.05[2].
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or a person who is especially affected by a public nuisance, may
use self help and "abate" (stop) the nuisance - and then sue the
malefactor for the costs of the abatement. Abatement includes
"removing ... or... destroying the thing which constitutes the
[nuisance]" as long as there is no "breach of the peace" or
"unnecessary injury."32 For example, one can break down doors,
smash locks, or tear down fences, if these acts are reasonably
necessary to abate the nuisance (provided that the other
elements discussed below are met).33
"Breach of the peace" is an elastic notion, usually
connoting actual or threatened violence or disturbance, such as
bad language, public nudity, demonstrations peaceful and not,
and so on. I read the abatement statutes in their traditional
context, where one might enter on the property of another to
turn off water, put out a fire, or remove smelly detritus.
Foreswearing a "breach of the peace" requires, in essence, that
such entry must be done without causing a noticeable fuss or
threatening the use of force. Assuming that a precision
counterstrike could be executed against a cyberattacker, the "no
breach of the peace" condition on the self help remedy would be
met. Therefore, a traditional nuisance doctrine would not
preclude the use of a targeted counterattack.
The lawfulness inquiry devolves, then, to whether a
cyberattack really qualifies as a nuisance. Granted, it fits the
open-ended statutory definition, but of course, much does.
Nuisance "has meant all things to all men, and has been applied
indiscriminately to everything from an alarming advertisement
to a cockroach baked in a pie."34 But of the three evils originally
discussed above - the infliction of malware, copyright
infringement, and unlicensed use of software - only malware
appears close to the notion of a nuisance. The other two boil
down to the same harm, copyright infringement, which is
essentially a theft of private property.
Moreover, unless nuisance is to swallow every harm, it's a
stretch to call infringement even a private nuisance. Indeed, it
is the cyberattacks of malware, not infringement, that the
32 CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 3495, 3502 (West 1997).
33 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 201 cmt. j (1965).
34 W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS § 86
(5th ed. 1984) (citations omitted).
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predominate counterstrike advocate has in mind. 35
Fundamentally, a nuisance is, among other things, an
unreasonable invasion of the victim's interests where there is no
reasonable basis for the action, including those actions arising
from a malicious desire to do harm for its own sake.36 A virus
probably fits the bill.
It is not, of course, clear how a court would apply the old
doctrine of nuisance to the Internet. We do know that the even
more venerable doctrine of trespass has been so applied. 37 Can
the same act of computer code or data intrusion be both a
trespass and a nuisance? The Intel court obscured the issue.
The legal debate comes down to a bizarre squabble over whether
the electro-magnetic signals which constitute the intrusion are
"tangible" and do "physical" damage to the property, like
"particulate matter" such as dirt (in which case we have a
trespass), or whether on the other hand, they are like the
"intangible" encroachments of light, noise, and odors which
interfere with the property - in which case we have a
nuisance. 38 The squabble is pointless because a computer-based
35 See Mullen, supra note 14.
36 See generally WILLIAM L. PROSSER & JOHN W. WADE, TORTS:
CASES AND MATERIALS 652-85 (4th ed. 1971).
37 See Intel, supra note 22; see also Oyster Software v. Forms
Processing Inc., No. C-00-0724 JCS, 2001 WL 1736382 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 6,
2001); Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 126 F. Supp. 2d 238 (S.D.N.Y. 2000);
eBay Inc. v. Bidder's Edge, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d 1085, 1071 (N.D. Cal. 2000).
38 In the context of this note, the argument is very much like
arguing about the number of angels that can fit on the head of a pin. For
those interested in the morbid details, a relatively recent pronouncement is
in San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. Superior Court, 13 Cal. 4th 893, 935 (1996),
which relies on and endorses the classic Wilson v. Interlake Steel Co., 32 Cal.
3d 229, 231-32 (1982) doctrine including the "particulate matter" language.
In San Diego, the California Supreme Court rejected a trespass case because
the electromagnetic radiation there (from power lines) was intangible, and
the court couldn't discern a "physical" damage to the property. San Diego
Gas & Electric, 32 Cal. 3d at 935-37. The Intel case fudges the issue: it holds
that intangible electronic signals are sufficiently tangible to support a
trespass case. At the same time, Intel cites both the San Diego and Wilson
cases. Intel pretends that the only binding legal rule extractable from those
two governing cases has nothing to do with the tangible/intangible
distinction, but rather that the electromagnetic radiation in San Diego is not
a trespass only because that radiation was not alleged to be "damaging" to
property; which is half true, and a punt. Intel, 114 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 251-252.
It is also a tad disingenuous, because just a few pages earlier, the Intel court
had noted that the damage to Intel was - not the crash of the property, i.e.,
the network - but rather "loss of productivity" as Intel's employees read the
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attack is all of those things. Just as light can be described as
either a wave or a particle, so too might a computer virus,
winging its electro-magnetic path into a network, be described
as either an intangible nuisance39 or a tangible trespass, as a
series of cases have stated.
40
If legislatures sympathized with the plight of victims of
spam, or malware, and with the frustration of using the legal
process to address the injury, they could statutorily define
selected acts as nuisances (as they have done with other acts
and conditions), and avoid the suspense. In the meantime, at
least Internet-mediated attacks such as viruses and worms fit
comfortably within the definition of a nuisance, and if so would
authorize and justify counterstrikes as "self help."
There is at least one last twist to this view of a
cyberattack as a nuisance, permitting (at least legally) self help
or counterstrike. The issue has to do with the efficacy of using
the defense of self help - which is a privilege of state law - in an
action brought under federal law. The issue is the extent to
which state privileges and defenses will stave off, for example, a
federal criminal prosecution under the Computer Fraud and
Abuse Act for unauthorized access to computer files. Normally
of course, federal law only applies to federal claims, and federal
law trumps state law. But there are exceptions. Sometimes,
even in federal question cases, state law supplies the "rule of
decision, ' 41 such as in a copyright case where a contract must be
interpreted, or where the court must decide if peace officers are
authorized to serve process. This is not a simple issue, because
each pertinent federal statute would need to be reviewed to
determine if it appeared to be conditioned on, or contemplated,
some state-defined notion or privileged access to self help. But
in the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, for example (the most
offending spam. Intel, 114 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 250. That loss of productivity, of
course, isn't damage to the "property" at issue. Thus Intel bypasses the one
holding it selectively extracts from precedent. At heart, the Intel court may
have suspected the tangible/intangible trespass/nuisance distinction was not
going to be fruitful, and could not be solved, in the Internet context.
39 Page County Appliance Center Inc. v. Honeywell Inc., 347
N.W.2d 171 (Iowa 1984) (holding that computer generated radiation
interfering with television reception is a nuisance).
40 See supra note 37.
41 See FED. R. EVID. 501; 23 CHARLES A. WRIGHT & KENNETH W.
GRAHAM, JR., 23 FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 5433, n.5 (1980); see
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likely candidate for a federal prosecution of a counterstrike
attack), it is not a stretch to suggest that the key notion of
"unauthorized" access to a computer could be defined under
state law - with "self- help" providing the "authorization."
V. CONCLUSION
Even under nuisance law, not every counterstrike - or
"self help" effort - is automatically immune. It has to be
reasonable, and proportional to the nuisance, issues I discussed
in connection with a similar requirement under self-defense.
And as always, the light cast by ancient doctrine upon novel
technologies will produce illumination and shadow both. Courts
will "fudge" on the analysis and struggle for precedent,
sometimes testing out the wrong one. Just as no one wants to
roll out version 1 (new software), no one wants to be a test case
in court. It is, as a surgeon might say when considering a
complex, multi-organ transplant, an interesting ease- not
something the patient likes to hear.
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